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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge 
Jeffrey Norman and David Elkin were the only two 
shareholders of US MobilComm Inc. (“USM”), a Delaware 
company that acquired and sold rights to radio frequencies.  
Norman held a minority interest and sought legal relief after 
he discovered that Elkin had transferred to another company 
the ownership of several frequencies purchased by USM, that 
Elkin had treated capital contributions as loans, and that Elkin 
had paid himself from USM funds without giving Norman 
any return on his minority investment.  It was the beginning 
of a long and tortuous litigation trail.  Despite two juries 
having sided with Norman, the verdicts in his favor were 
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overturned.  Most of his claims were ultimately held to be 
barred by the statute of limitations, after the District Court 
rejected his argument that a state court case he had brought to 
inspect USM’s books and records pursuant to § 220 of Title 8 
of the Delaware Code tolled the statute of limitations.  Other 
claims were eliminated for insufficient evidence.  Norman 
now appeals, seeking to restore portions of each of the two 
jury verdicts he won and also to allow him to pursue certain 
claims that had been foreclosed by the District Court.  Elkin 
cross-appeals and asks us to affirm on alternative grounds the 
several rulings rejecting Norman’s claims.  
 
We conclude that the District Court erred in 
concluding that tolling of the statute of limitations is 
categorically inappropriate when a plaintiff has inquiry notice 
before initiating a books and records action in the Delaware 
courts.  Accordingly, we will send most of the claims back to 
the District Court to determine whether tolling should have 
applied and, if so, whether any of the claims are nevertheless 
time-barred.  We also conclude that the District Court erred 
when it vacated the jury’s award of nominal damages for one 
of Norman’s breach of contract claims.  Finally, we hold that 
Norman’s fraud claim was not supported by sufficient proof 
of damages and we thus affirm judgment as a matter of law 
on that claim on the alternative grounds that Elkin has 
proposed.   
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1  
 
In the early 1990s, the FCC announced plans to grant 
licenses for the commercialization of 220 megahertz (“MHz”) 
radio frequencies.  Those frequencies had previously been 
available only for non-commercial purposes, so entrepreneurs 
anticipated that the newly available frequencies would create 
lucrative business opportunities.  Such ambitions were 
frustrated, however, by technological failures and regulatory 
logjams, and investor hopes eventually turned to 
disappointment.  This case is a consequence of the bursting of 
the 220 MHz bubble.   
 
A.  The Auction and Sale of Frequencies   
 
Norman and Elkin founded USM in order to acquire, 
develop, and sell licenses to 220 MHz frequencies.  In 1991-
92, the FCC granted the first wave (Phase I) of 220 MHz 
licenses by lottery.  Norman’s primary responsibility at USM 
was to acquire, aggregate, and manage licenses held by 
individual Phase I license holders throughout the country.  By 
1996, USM had successfully acquired around 40-50 licenses 
and entered into agreements to manage over 150 more.  At 
that point, Norman’s involvement in the day-to-day business 
affairs of USM ceased.  Elkin, by contrast, continued to 
manage the company.     
                                              
1 Because Norman’s claims were dismissed pursuant to 
Elkin’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, we 
must “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to 
[Norman] and giv[e] [him] the advantage of every fair and 
reasonable inference[.]”  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 
4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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In 1998, the FCC began the second phase of licensing 
through a competitive auction.  Elkin registered USM for the 
auction and USM won the rights to several frequencies.  
Those rights were subsequently registered in the name of 
another company that Elkin owned, The Elkin Group 
(“TEG”).  According to Elkin, the involvement of TEG was 
necessary because USM did not have the funds to participate 
in the auction or bid on any of the licenses without TEG’s 
assistance.  Elkin also said he wanted to make sure that a 
friendly corporation acquired the licenses that overlapped 
with those already owned by USM.  Norman v. Elkin 
(“Norman I”), CIV. A. No. 06-005, 2007 WL 2822798, at *2 
(D. Del. Sept. 26, 2007). 
 
Norman closely monitored the FCC’s bidding process 
and, a few days after the auction, he e-mailed Elkin asking for 
more information about the auction results.  He also called the 
FCC to inquire into the status of USM’s licenses acquired 
through the second phase auction.  Some FCC notices 
referred to USM as the winning bidder, while other public 
documents referred to TEG as the owner of the licenses.   
 
B.  Capitalization and the Shareholder Loan  
  Agreement  
 
Norman owns 25% of the stock of USM and Elkin 
owns 75%.  When they founded USM, they entered into an 
oral agreement to invest a proportional share of capital in the 
company to meet a million dollar capital requirement – 
Norman promised to invest $250,000 while Elkin promised to 
invest $750,000.  Despite those promises, disputes over 
contributions quickly arose.  Norman allegedly only 
contributed $200,000 of his $250,000 obligation.  Elkin also 
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failed to make his full capital contribution; he initially 
furnished around $360,000.  Further complicating what was 
supposed to be a straightforward capitalization story, Elkin 
and Richard Shorin, the Assistant Secretary of USM, felt that 
Norman had spent USM’s funds on personal matters and so, 
at Elkin’s direction, USM treated those expenditures as 
capital outlays and reduced Norman’s capital contribution to 
approximately $140,000.   
 
Elkin claimed to believe that he was only required to 
maintain a capital contribution proportional to Norman’s 
contribution.  So he reduced his own contribution target to 
$420,000.  He did that by causing USM to enter into a 
“Shareholder Loan Agreement” sometime between 1995 and 
2002.  Consistent with that document, USM agreed to treat 
any amount that Elkin contributed to the company above 
$420,000 as a loan.2  Subsequently, Elkin gave additional 
sums to keep USM afloat, and a document listing all of 
Elkin’s purported loans (the “Shareholder Loan Schedule”) 
showed that Elkin had loaned USM more than $690,000, 
including certain capital contributions that were converted 
into loans.   
 
In 2000 and 2001, USM sold off its Phase I licenses.  
It prioritized repayment of Elkin’s loans and paid him 
$615,026, without giving Norman any money.  One of the 
                                              
2 The Shareholder Loan Agreement itself is dated 
September 1, 1995, but Elkin could not recall exactly when 
he entered into the Agreement, and at trial he testified that it 
was agreed to in 1997 and executed in 2000.  Other trial 
documents provide conflicting dates.  The actual date is not 
relevant to this appeal.  
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key issues in this case is when Norman knew or should have 
known about those payments.  He received federal income tax 
K-1 forms from USM each year, and in 2000 and 2001 the 
forms declared that USM had realized a capital gain.  Those 
K-1 forms did not state what had been sold, and they did not 
list any shareholder loans or distributions.  However, in a 
deposition, Norman admitted that “a capital gain, by 
definition … has to be sale of a license[.]”  (App. at 512.)    
 
In the summer of 2002, Norman and Elkin had a 
telephone conversation, after not having spoken in a long 
time.  Elkin said that some licenses had been sold.  Norman 
described the call as follows:  
 
I logged a call into him and said: Hey, what is 
going on with the company? And he was a little 
bit evasive as I recall.  And then I pointedly 
asked him: Has anything been sold?  And he 
said: Yes. And I said: Well, what? And he goes: 
Well, we sold some licenses.  And I forget the 
cities he even said.  
 
I said: Well, did you take a distribution?  And 
he said: Yeah. I said: Well, you know, what 
about me basically?  And he said: Oh, it wasn’t 
your turn. 
 
(App. at 860-61.)  Norman asked for additional information, 
which Elkin never sent.  Later, on October 2, 2002, Norman’s 
attorney sent a letter (the “October 2002 Letter”) requesting 
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information pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220.3  Specifically, the 
letter requested information regarding “the sale or other 
disposition of any assets or stock of [USM] over the past 
three (3) years, and the distribution or use of any proceeds of 
any such sales or dispositions.”  (App. at 228.)   
 
Approximately two months passed and, on 
December 3, 2002, Norman received a letter (the “December 
2002 Letter”) from Elkin acknowledging that USM had sold 
the licenses “it owned.”  (App. at 231).  The letter included 
purchase and sale agreements which revealed that TEG sold 
some of the Phase II licenses acquired during the auction.  
The letter also included a breakdown of the uses of the 
proceeds, including repayment of what were characterized as 
shareholder loans, but it significantly understated the amount 
paid to Elkin.  The Shareholder Loan Agreement was 
subsequently included in a letter that USM sent to Norman’s 
attorney in October 2003 (the “October 2003 Letter”) in 
response to a request for further information.  Norman v. 
Elkin (“Norman II”), 726 F. Supp. 2d 464, 472 (D. Del. 
2010); (App. at 128, 131).  
 
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The in-court battles between the parties began on 
November 16, 2004, more than a year before the fight became 
a federal case.  Norman filed suit under 8 Del. C. § 220 in the 
                                              
3 Section 220 allows a stockholder to request 
inspection of the books and records of a corporation and, if 
his request is rebuffed, he is entitled to bring an action in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery to compel inspection.  8 Del. C. 
§ 220(b)-(c). 
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Delaware Court of Chancery to compel Elkin to allow 
inspection of USM’s books and records.  Elkin vigorously 
opposed that proceeding and it dragged on for almost a year, 
until October 2, 2005, when the Chancery Court compelled 
USM to disclose the requested documents.4   
 
Norman filed the complaint that is the foundation of 
this appeal on December 5, 2005.  Though he filed it in the 
Court of Chancery, the case was, at Elkin’s instigation, 
promptly removed to the District Court.  Norman raised a 
wide variety of tort and contract claims against Elkin,5 USM, 
and TEG (collectively, the “Defendants”) including breach of 
contract, usurpation of corporate opportunities, conversion, 
fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, and unjust enrichment.6  
                                              
4 Elkin argues unconvincingly that the Chancery 
Court’s order in the § 220 action  is not part of the record in 
this appeal.  Norman had offered the order into evidence but 
the order was excluded by the District Court.  It is, 
nonetheless, part of the record.  See Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. 
Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 682 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining 
that the record on appeal “includes items admitted into 
evidence, but also includes items presented to the district 
court and not admitted into evidence” (quoting Waldorf v. 
Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 620 (3d Cir. 1998))).   
 
5 Elkin filed counterclaims, none of which are 
pertinent at this point.   
 
6 More precisely, Norman’s claims were: 1) breach of 
the oral contract between Norman and Elkin regarding capital 
contributions and equity in USM, 2) usurpation of corporate 
opportunities by bidding on FCC licenses for TEG rather than 
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With regard to his breach of contract claim, Norman alleged 
that he and Elkin entered into an oral contract about the 
amount of capital they would contribute and the equity they 
would each receive.  Norman advanced three theories of 
breach: 1) that Elkin had failed to pay him his (Norman’s) pro 
rata share of all proceeds, 2) that Elkin had refused to 
maintain his (Elkin’s) full capital contribution of $750,000, 
and 3) that Elkin had improperly caused USM to enter into 
the Shareholder Loan Agreement.7     
 
A. Summary Judgment Opinion (Norman I)  
 
The Defendants eventually moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that all of Norman’s claims were barred by 
the statute of limitations.  Norman I, 2007 WL 2822798, at 
                                                                                                     
USM, 3) breach of fiduciary duty (including the duties of 
loyalty, care, and good faith), 4) breach of the duty of 
disclosure, 5) conversion and misappropriation of the Phase II 
licenses, 6) fraudulent misrepresentation (via the December 
2002 Letter), and 7) unjust enrichment.  Norman also claimed 
that Shorin aided and abetted Elkin’s wrongful conduct, but 
the District Court granted Shorin summary judgment on that 
claim and it is not part of this appeal.  Norman v. Elkin 
(“Norman II”), 726 F. Supp. 2d 464, 478-79 (D. Del. 2010).  
 
7 In his amended complaint, Norman listed four bases 
for his breach of contract claim.  By the time of the first trial, 
however, Norman’s position was “that Elkin breached [his] 
agreement in [the] three (3) distinct ways,” as discussed 
above.  (Norman v. Elkin, CIV. A. No. 06-005, Docket Item 
(“D.I.”) 61 at p 3.)   
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*3-4.  In the course of denying that motion, the District Court 
made several rulings relevant to this appeal.  It first 
determined the applicable statute of limitations.  Id. at *3.  
Since the suit was brought in Delaware, it applied Delaware’s 
procedural law, including the state’s borrowing statute, 10 
Del. C. § 8121.8  Norman I, 2007 WL 2822798, at *4.  On 
that basis, it decided that Delaware law required that 
Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations be applied to 
all but the breach of contract claim, since Pennsylvania’s 
limitations period was shorter than Delaware’s for those non-
contract claims.9  Id.  For the breach of contract claim, the 
                                              
8 That statute provides in relevant part: 
 
Where a cause of action arises outside of this 
State, an action cannot be brought in a court of 
this State to enforce such cause of action after 
the expiration of whichever is shorter, the time 
limited by the law of this State, or the time 
limited by the law of the state or country where 
the cause of action arose, for bringing an action 
upon such cause of action.  
 
10 Del. C. § 8121. 
 
9 At the time that Norman filed suit, Elkin and Shorin 
were both residents of Pennsylvania and TEG was 
incorporated in Pennsylvania.  USM’s principal place of 
business was also in Pennsylvania.  Given the several 
connections between the dispute and Pennsylvania, the 
District Court concluded that, for purposes of the Delaware 
borrowing statute, “[t]he parties do not dispute that … the 
conduct underlying the causes of action arose in 
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Court applied Delaware’s three-year limitations period, rather 
than Pennsylvania’s four-year period.  Id.   
 
The District Court then accepted Norman’s argument 
that the statute of limitations for all of the claims was tolled 
as a result of Elkin’s alleged wrongdoing and concealment of 
facts.  Id. at *5.  Accordingly, “the statute of limitations 
began to run at the time [Norman] knew or had reason to 
know of the facts constituting the alleged wrong.”  Id.  The 
Court emphasized that “the date on which [Norman] knew or 
should have known the facts constituting his claims is a 
material dispute of fact” and therefore concluded that the 
claims could not be ruled untimely at the summary judgment 
stage.  Id.  
 
B. First Trial and Post-Trial Motions (Norman II) 
 
Three of Norman’s nine claims went to trial: breach of 
contract, fraud, and conversion.  Norman II, 726 F. Supp. 2d 
at 468.  The District Court did not allow the other claims to 
go to the jury and stated that it would reserve judgment as to 
whether any of them were viable.10  Id.  After a three-day 
                                                                                                     
Pennsylvania.”  Norman v. Elkin (“Norman I”), CIV. A. No. 
06-005, 2007 WL 2822798, at *4 (D. Del. Sept. 26, 2007).  
That conclusion has not been challenged on appeal.  
 
10 The District Court stated that it was “going to 
reserve for post-trial briefing the question of whether the 
[other] claims … [were] direct or derivative in nature.”  (D.I. 
129 at p. 2-3.)  However, after trial the Court dismissed the 
other claims solely on the basis of the statute of limitations.  
Norman II, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 468-76.  Federal Rule of Civil 
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trial, the jury returned a verdict for Norman and awarded him 
$105,756 in compensatory damages and $48,000 in punitive 
damages on the fraud claim, $38,000 in compensatory 
damages on the conversion claim, and $1 in nominal damages 
on the breach of contract claim.  Id.  The combined verdict 
was “equal to $1 more than [Norman’s] 25% share of 
distributions.”  Norman v. Elkin (“Norman III”), 849 F. Supp. 
2d 418, 421 (D. Del. 2012) (citation omitted).   
 
In post-trial motions, Elkin once again argued that 
Norman’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations.  
Norman II, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 469.  The District Court agreed 
with that argument with regard to all claims except for the 
breach of contract claim.  Id. at 468-76.  It held that two of 
Norman’s three breach of contract theories were not barred – 
the one dealing with Elkin’s failure to make pro rata 
distributions, and the other with the creation of the 
Shareholder Loan Agreement.   Id. at 471, 479.  But the Court 
decided that the breach of contract theory based on Elkin’s 
failure to provide his promised capital contribution was time-
barred because Norman had been aware of that failure since 
1995.11  Id. at 471. 
                                                                                                     
Procedure 50(b) notes that a post-trial motion for judgment as 
a matter of law may “address[] a jury issue not decided by a 
verdict” and that the Court may “decid[e] the legal questions 
raised by the motion.”    
 
11 In his complaint, Norman framed a single breach of 
contract claim, but the verdict form used at the first trial 
asked the jury to state, for each of Norman’s three theories of 
breach, whether Elkin had breached the alleged contract 
dealing with capital contributions and equity ownership.  The 
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For the theory of breach based on the pro rata 
distribution, the Court concluded, “based on the evidence 
adduced at trial, that [Norman] did not learn of [the] … 
purported recharacterization of Defendant Elkin’s equity 
contributions into shareholder loans … until October 2003.”  
Id.  Consequently, that theory of breach was held to be timely 
asserted.  Id.   
 
For the theory of breach based on the Shareholder 
Loan Agreement, the Court noted that Elkin had not raised a 
statute of limitations defense.  Id. at 476.  The Court also 
rejected Elkin’s argument that the breach of contract theory 
based on the Shareholder Loan Agreement was merely 
duplicative of the other breach of contract theories, 
concluding that there was sufficient evidence “on which the 
jury could have concluded that an agreement between 
[Norman] and [Elkin] existed for [Elkin] to contribute 
                                                                                                     
form then asked the jury to reach a single sum to compensate 
Norman for all of the damages he suffered due to a breach 
under any of the three theories.  In contrast, the verdict form 
used at the second trial treated the two remaining breach of 
contract theories as if they were separate claims.  That form 
asked the jury to decide whether the execution of the 
Shareholder Loan Agreement constituted a breach of Elkin’s 
oral contract with Norman, and asked the jury to determine 
damages.  It then asked the jury about the failure to make pro 
rata distributions and asked the jury to list a separate damages 
amount.  In his post-trial motion after the second trial, Elkin 
argued that the District Court erred in allowing the jury to 
consider two separate claims when the amended complaint 
had only one.  As discussed further herein, we conclude that 
Norman was entitled to present two claims to the jury. 
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$750,000 in capital, and that [Elkin] breached that agreement 
when he executed the Shareholder Loan Agreement to 
convert any funds in excess of $420,000 from capital to 
loans.”  Id. at 477.   
 
The Court ruled that the fraud claim was time-barred 
because Norman had been on notice of the alleged fraud no 
later than when he received the October 2003 Letter, which 
was outside the two year limitations period.  Id. at 472.  The 
conversion claim was also barred either because “the 
existence of publicly available information concerning 
[TEG’s] purported ownership demonstrates that [Norman] 
was not incapable of learning the facts giving rise to his 
conversion and usurpation claims until the § 220 Action,” or 
because of the December 2002 Letter.  Id. at 473.  Norman’s 
other claims were held to be time-barred on the basis of a 
combination of the December 2002 Letter and the October 
2003 Letter, which, the District Court concluded, put him on 
inquiry notice.  Id. at 470-76.  The Court rejected Norman’s 
argument that the statute of limitations should have been 
tolled when he filed his § 220 action in November 2004.  Id. 
at 470-73.  As the Court saw it, inquiry notice existed before 
that action was filed and so § 220 could not be a basis for 
tolling.  Id. at 472.   
 
In short, the District Court affirmed the jury’s 
judgment only as to the breach of contract claim and the 
attendant nominal damages.  Id. at 479.  It therefore entered 
an Amended Judgment in July 2010, substantially altering the 
jury’s verdict.   
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C. Granting a New Trial (Norman III) 
 
Norman promptly moved to alter or amend the 
judgment or for a new trial, arguing that the jury’s verdict of 
only $1 in damages should be vacated.12  The Court agreed, 
concluding that $1 in damages was “against the clear weight 
of the evidence” since the jury’s verdict was plainly 
predicated on a finding that Norman did not receive his pro 
rata share of the proceeds from the sale of USM’s assets.  
Norman III, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 424.  A new trial was thus 
ordered “limited exclusively to the issue of appropriate 
damages for the breach of contract claim.”  Id. at 425.  Elkin 
responded with a motion for reconsideration, challenging the 
limited scope of the new trial.  The District Court then 
changed its order and granted a new trial on the merits of the 
breach of contract claim because, the Court concluded, there 
were disputed issues of material fact that remained.  The 
Court also ruled that the statute of limitations could once 
again be raised as a defense.   
 
D. Second Trial and Post-Trial Motions (Norman  
  IV) 
 
The second jury trial was held in December 2014, and 
the result was again a verdict in Norman’s favor.  The jury 
awarded him nominal damages for Elkin’s breach of contract 
arising from the recharacterization of capital pursuant to the 
Shareholder Loan Agreement, and $73,180.17 for Elkin’s 
breach of contract for failing to distribute proceeds from the 
                                              
12 At this point in the proceedings, the District Judge 
who had been handling the case retired and the matter was 
reassigned.     
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license sales in a pro rata fashion.  The verdict was equal to a 
pro rata portion of the amount that Elkin received from USM, 
minus Elkin’s claimed loans to USM in excess of $750,000.     
 
The parties again filed a variety of post-trial motions.  
Elkin argued that no damages arose as a result of “the mere 
act of executing the Shareholder Loan Agreement[.]”  
Norman v. Elkin (“Norman IV”), CIV. A. No. 06-005, 2015 
WL 4886049, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 14, 2015).  The District 
Court agreed and noted that “Norman’s counsel conceded that 
he did not present evidence that Norman was damaged by the 
execution of the [Shareholder Loan Agreement], independent 
of the alleged derivative damages resulting from execution of 
the Agreement.”  Id.  By “derivative damages,” the Court 
apparently meant the failure to pay Norman a pro rata share 
from the sale of licenses because the Shareholder Loan 
Agreement had reclassified some of Elkin’s capital 
contributions as loans.  The claim of breach based on the 
Shareholder Loan Agreement was, in other words, viewed by 
the Court as duplicative of the other remaining breach of 
contract claim.  The Court accordingly entered judgment in 
favor of Elkin on the Shareholder Loan Agreement claim.   
 
Elkin also argued once again that the statute of 
limitations barred the breach of contract claim that was based 
on the failure to make pro rata distributions.  Id.  This time, 
the Court agreed.  Id.  It reconsidered its prior ruling on this 
point because, it said, the evidence presented in the second 
trial filled an “evidentiary hole” from the first trial.  Id.  The 
Court concluded that “[t]he evidence now in the record shows 
that a reasonable person in Norman’s position would have 
had inquiry notice of his claims before December 2, 2002.”  
Id. at *3.  In reaching that conclusion, the District Court 
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relied on several things: the tax documents (i.e., the K-1’s) 
that Norman received in 2001 and 2002, the summer 2002 
phone call during which Elkin admitted to taking a 
distribution, and the fact that, in the October 2002 Letter, 
Norman and his attorney requested additional information 
about sales and distributions.  Id.  Under those circumstances, 
the Court decided, “a person would know enough to put him 
on notice that he should undertake further inquiry, in order to 
determine if a wrong had been committed against him.”  Id.  
Accordingly, the District Court vacated the jury’s verdict and 
entered a final judgment in Elkin’s favor.  Norman appealed.  
So did Elkin, focusing on the sufficiency of the evidence for 
the fraud and conversion claims.  
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III. DISCUSSION13 
 
 A. Timeliness of the Claims 
 
 On appeal, Norman challenges many of the District 
Court’s rulings on the statute of limitations.14  He argues that 
                                              
13 This case was removed from the Delaware Court of 
Chancery, under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review 
of an order granting or denying a motion for judgment as a 
matter of law and apply the same standard as the district 
court.” Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citation omitted); cf. Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 365 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (“[P]lenary review extends to the District Court’s 
choice and interpretation of applicable tolling principles and 
its conclusion that the facts prevented a tolling of the statute 
of limitations.”).  “[A]lthough the court draws all reasonable 
and logical inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, we must 
affirm an order granting judgment as a matter of law if, upon 
review of the record, it is apparent that the verdict is not 
supported by legally sufficient evidence.”  Lightning Lube, 
Inc., 4 F.3d at 1166.  As to Elkin’s sufficiency of the evidence 
arguments, we likewise “view[] the evidence in the light most 
favorable to [Norman]” and will affirm the District Court 
only if there “is insufficient evidence from which a jury 
reasonably could find liability [against Elkin].”  Id.  
 
14 Norman does not challenge the judgment entered 
against his claim that Elkin breached his contract by failing to 
contribute his full capital contribution.  Because that issue is 
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the Court applied the wrong statute of limitations and also 
that it should have tolled the limitations period.  We conclude 
that the District Court applied the correct limitations period 
but that it erred by applying the wrong standard when 
determining whether to toll the limitations period after 
Norman filed his § 220 action.  Accordingly, we will remand 
to allow reconsideration of whether the limitations period 
should have been tolled and whether Norman’s claims are 
timely.  
 
  1. The Limitations Period for the Non- 
   Contract Claims 
 
Norman claims that Delaware’s longer limitations 
period should be applied to his non-fraud claims, particularly 
the conversion claim, since, under what is often called the 
“internal affairs doctrine,” Delaware law generally applies to 
disputes involving Delaware corporations and their 
shareholders.  See Citigroup Inc. v. AHW Inv. P’ship, 140 
A.3d 1125, 1135 (Del. 2016) (explaining that such disputes 
are “governed by the law of the state of incorporation 
exclusively”).  According to Norman, “this would necessarily 
include the choice of the relevant statute of limitations.”  
(Opening Br. at 52.) 
 
Norman points to no case law in support of the 
dubious premise that the internal affairs doctrine requires the 
application of Delaware’s statute of limitations to all claims 
in every case involving a Delaware-chartered corporation and 
                                                                                                     
not preserved on appeal, it is waived.  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 
F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).   
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its stockholders.  We do not need to consider the full reach of 
the internal affairs doctrine to recognize that premise as an 
overreach.  See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 214 
(Del. 1987) (noting that the internal affairs doctrine extends 
only to “those matters which are peculiar to the relationships 
among or between the corporation and its current officers, 
directors, and shareholders”).  And, in any event, Norman has 
no legitimate cause for complaint about the choice of law 
here because the District Court did apply Delaware law, 
namely the Delaware borrowing statute, to determine that 
application of Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations was 
required.  See Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int’l, Inc., 983 
F.2d 485, 494 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that “the traditional rule 
that statutes of limitations are governed by forum law has 
been modified by [the borrowing] statute”).15 
                                              
15 The District Court observed that “[t]he parties do not 
dispute that the causes of action arose outside of Delaware.”  
Norman I, 2007 WL 2822798, at *4.  Under Delaware law, 
the question of where a cause of action arose is determined by 
reference “to Delaware’s conflict of law rules.”  TrustCo 
Bank v. Mathews, CIV. A. No. 8374, 2015 WL 295373, at *9 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2015).  And for disputes involving the 
internal affairs of Delaware corporations, the internal affairs 
doctrine does indeed counsel the selection of Delaware’s 
substantive law.  Citigroup Inc. v. AHW Inv. P’ship, 140 A.3d 
1125, 1135 (Del. 2016).  Accordingly, Norman might have 
argued that some of his causes of action arose in Delaware 
rather than Pennsylvania.  But he did not.  He has not 
challenged the District Court’s conclusion – evidently based 
on positions taken during the litigation – that his causes of 
action arose in Pennsylvania.  Instead, he advances the 
separate argument that because the “internal affairs doctrine 
Case: 16-1924     Document: 003112649216     Page: 21      Date Filed: 06/13/2017
22 
 
Norman also argues that, because of Elkin’s allegedly 
fraudulent self-dealing, the District Court should have 
forbidden Elkin from asserting a statute of limitations defense 
and should have instead applied the equitable doctrine of 
laches.  In support, Norman relies on a line of authority 
flowing from the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., which held that, in cases 
involving corporate fiduciaries engaged in fraudulent self-
dealing at the expense of the corporation, the statute of 
limitations for fraud claims will not necessarily apply.  38 
A.2d 808, 814 (Del. 1944).  We have interpreted Bovay to 
provide an exception to the applicable statute of limitations 
when a controlling shareholder “derive[s] personal profits 
from his manipulation of [a corporation] in violation of his 
fiduciary obligations.”  Borden v. Sinskey, 530 F.2d 478, 488 
(3d Cir. 1976).  In such circumstances, “the timeliness of 
plaintiffs’ … claims [is] to be determined by the doctrine of 
laches.”  Cantor v. Perelman, 414 F.3d 430, 439 (3d Cir. 
2005).  That may be pertinent to some of Norman’s claims.  
 
But, even if the District Court should have applied 
laches, that would not have changed the outcome.16  Laches 
                                                                                                     
occupies the entire relationship between a fiduciary and the 
stockholder. … even procedural considerations are governed 
by Delaware law .”  (Opening Br. at 51.)  That argument fails 
for the reasons just explained. 
 
16 Subsequent cases have called the scope of Bovay 
into question and limited its application to particularly 
egregious cases.  See Halpern v. Barran, 313 A.2d 139, 142 
(Del. Ch. 1973) (noting that Bovay “involved particularly 
egregious conduct and its application has been consistently 
Case: 16-1924     Document: 003112649216     Page: 22      Date Filed: 06/13/2017
23 
 
ordinarily runs parallel to the statute of limitations, Bovay, 38 
A.2d at 815, and extends the limitations period only when 
“extraordinary circumstances make it inequitable” to allow 
the statute of limitations to operate as a bar,  id. (citation 
omitted).  Delaware courts have concluded that “equity will 
not relieve against the bar of the statute [of limitations] in 
favor of a party who has been in laches in not using means 
within his power to discover the fraud.”  Kahn v. Seaboard 
Corp., 625 A.2d 269, 276 (Del. Ch. 1993) (quoting Sparks v. 
Farmers’ Bank, 3 Del. Ch. 274, 306 (1869)).  Accordingly, 
“where wrongful self-dealing is alleged,” a claim will not be 
barred until “the plaintiff … knew or had reason to know the 
facts alleged to give rise to the wrong.”  Id. at 276-77 (relying 
on Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 251 (Del. 1970), 
disapproved of on other grounds by Tooley v. Donaldson, 
Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004)).  That is 
exactly the approach the District Court took.  It tolled the 
limitations period until Norman should have become aware of 
Elkin’s alleged improprieties.  Accordingly, there was no 
discernible error in its ruling on the timeliness of the non-
breach of contract claims.   
 
  2. Section 220 Tolling 
 
 Delaware law, embodied in § 220 of Title 8 of the 
Delaware Code, allows stockholders to demand the right to 
inspect the books and records of a corporation and to seek an 
order from the Delaware Court of Chancery compelling such 
inspection if a demand is ignored or rebuffed.  The courts of 
                                                                                                     
restricted in later decisions”).  We need not decide whether 
Bovay would apply here.  
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Delaware have, on several occasions, tolled the limitations 
period for claims of fiduciary malfeasance while a § 220 
action is pending.  Sutherland v. Sutherland, CIV. A. No. 
2399, 2013 WL 2362263, at *6 n.70 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2013) 
(involving self-dealing); Orloff v. Shulman, CIV. A. No. 852, 
2005 WL 3272355, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005) 
(involving fraud and breach of fiduciary duty); Technicorp 
Intern. II, Inc. v. Johnston, CIV. A. No. 15084, 2000 WL 
713750 at *9 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2000) (involving fraudulent 
self-dealing).  The District Court, however, concluded that a 
“§ 220 [a]ction will not operate to toll the statute of 
limitations in a situation such as this, where [Norman] had 
inquiry notice of his … claim before initiating the § 220 
[a]ction.”  Norman II, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 472.  We have never 
before considered the extent of tolling offered by a 
stockholder’s resort to a § 220 action, but we are persuaded 
that the District Court’s interpretation of Delaware law on this 
point was flawed.   
 
 Delaware case law does not support a categorical rule 
forbidding tolling when a § 220 action is filed after a plaintiff 
has inquiry notice.  Indeed, the primary opinion relied upon 
by the District Court, Technicorp International II, Inc. v. 
Johnston, suggests that a § 220 action may operate to toll a 
limitations period even when there is inquiry notice.  In that 
case, the Court of Chancery held that it was “settled Delaware 
Law” that the applicable statute of limitations “was tolled 
during the pendency of ... [the] § 220 … action[].”  2000 WL 
713750, at *9.  There is no indication in Technicorp that 
inquiry notice should necessarily vitiate tolling.  To the 
contrary, the shareholder in that case almost certainly had 
inquiry notice due to a report from a forensic accounting firm, 
id. at *6, and the Chancery Court noted that pursuit of an 
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action under § 220 is “regarded as strong evidence that [a] 
plaintiff was aggressively asserting its claims at that time[,]” 
id. at *9 n.26 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
So Technicorp cuts against the rule adopted by the District 
Court.  
 
The District Court’s categorical denial of tolling is also 
incompatible with Delaware’s apparent intent to encourage 
§ 220 actions as a way to allow stockholders to resolve 
disputes with the aid of a streamlined books and records 
proceeding.  See Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 
CIV. A. No. 7455, 2017 WL 239364, at *3 (Del. Jan. 18, 
2017) (noting that “Section 220 proceedings are supposed to 
be streamlined and summary”); see also King v. VeriFone 
Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1145 (Del. 2011) (noting that 
“Delaware courts have strongly encouraged stockholder-
plaintiffs to utilize Section 220”).  The Delaware Supreme 
Court has explained, in a different context, that courts should 
not “penaliz[e] diligent counsel who has employed [§ 220] … 
in a deliberate and thorough manner in preparing a 
complaint[.]”  Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 n.10 
(Del. 1993) (applying the “first to file” rule for derivative 
litigation); see also Technicorp, 2000 WL 713750, at *9 n.26 
(“[A]ccept[ing] … [D]efendants’ time-bar argument would 
penalize, not encourage, the use of those important tools.”).  
But a rule that automatically forbade tolling once a party had 
inquiry notice would do just that.  Indeed, if a shareholder has 
enough suspicion of wrongdoing to file a successful § 220 
action, then there is some probability that the shareholder also 
has inquiry notice.  See, Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting 
& Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 567 (Del. 1997) (holding that, to 
institute a proper § 220 action to investigate fraud, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate “a credible basis to find probable 
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wrongdoing”).  The District Court’s categorical exception 
would seem to swallow the general principle that tolling may 
apply after the filing of a § 220 action, and that ruling thus 
cannot stand.17  
 
The filing of a § 220 action does not, however, 
automatically toll the applicable limitations period.  Delaware 
courts have refused to draw such a bright line and have 
instead said that “there is no hard and fast rule tolling the 
running of the statute of limitations during the pendency of 
books and records litigation[,]” but that “[t]he pendency of 
such an action, and the relationship between it and the claims 
eventually filed, may in some circumstances operate to toll 
the limitations period[.]”  Sutherland v. Sutherland, 2009 WL 
1177047, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2009).  Considerations such 
as the existence of “deceitful, bad faith conduct,” Technicorp, 
2000 WL 713750, at *7, or evidence that, “without the 
information gathered during the [§] 220 action,” suit could 
not have been brought, Orloff, 2005 WL 3272355, at *10, are 
                                              
17 Elkin suggests that tolling should apply to only 
equitable rather than legal claims.  But Technicorp offers no 
support for that conclusion.  In that case, the plaintiff sought 
$28.5 million dollars in damages in addition to a variety of 
equitable remedies.  Technicorp Intern. II, Inc. v. Johnston, 
CIV. A. No. 15084, 2000 WL 713750, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. 
May 31, 2000).  The Chancery Court noted that even if some 
of the claims were subject to the statute of limitations, the 
limitations period would be tolled due to the § 220 action.  Id. 
at *9.  Thus, tolling could apply to both the legal and 
equitable claims, were this case still being litigated in a 
Delaware court. 
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factors favoring tolling.  But such factors do not appear to be 
prerequisites to tolling.  The parties have not directed us to 
any case (apart from the District Court’s opinion here) 
refusing to toll the limitations period after a successful § 220 
action. It seems, instead, that Delaware law preserves a 
court’s discretion to toll or not toll the limitations period on 
claims that may be informed by the results of a § 220 action.  
The decision to toll is not dependent upon inquiry notice. 18      
                                              
18 Judge Shwartz has a different perspective on this 
point.  To her, this test could allow a plaintiff who already has 
sufficient facts to bring suit to use the filing of a § 220 action 
to avoid promptly proceeding – in effect, to use it as a shield 
from the statute of limitations.  Judge Shwartz is of the view 
that, under Delaware law, a § 220 action tolls the statute of 
limitations when the plaintiff could not have filed his 
complaint without the information obtained through that 
action, see Orloff, 2005 WL 3272355, at *10, or at least could 
not have developed his claims without access to the 
corporation’s books and records, see Sutherland, 2013 WL 
2362263, at *6 n.70, and, by extension, that tolling would be 
improper where a plaintiff has sufficient evidence to proceed, 
such as where the information acquired through the § 220 
action was not necessary for the plaintiff to file his complaint.  
To hold otherwise, she believes, could enable a plaintiff to 
use a § 220 action to delay filing a lawsuit to gain a tactical 
advantage.  She notes that because a § 220 action provides a 
means for early and expedited discovery, a plaintiff may seek 
to use the action for purposes beyond simply determining 
whether he has a cause of action.  See Rales v. Blasband, 634 
A.2d 927, 934 n.10 (Del. 1993) (describing § 220 “as an 
information-gathering tool” available to shareholders 
investigating the “possibility” of wrongdoing).  
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Courts in our Circuit should proceed with due regard 
for the positive role that § 220 actions are meant to play under 
Delaware law.  That is especially true when, as in this case, a 
Delaware court has exercised its judgment and concluded that 
a § 220 action has merit.19   See Wolst v. Monster Beverage 
Corp., CIV. A. No. 9154, 2014 WL 4966139, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 3, 2014) (noting that “[a] stockholder invoking her rights 
under Section 220 must demonstrate a ‘proper purpose’ for 
the inspection” (quoting 8 Del. C. § 220(b))).  In such 
circumstances, tolling is likely appropriate absent a 
countermanding consideration, such as evidence that a 
shareholder pursued the § 220 action in bad faith or in order 
to stall.   
 
Norman did successfully seek relief under § 220 and 
there is no indication that he proceeded in bad faith.  In fact, 
he can point to valuable information that he acquired through 
his § 220 action.  For instance, relevant to his fraud claim, he 
gained access to the Shareholder Loan Schedule which 
contained loan repayment figures that differed from those in 
                                                                                                     
 
19 In this case, the Court of Chancery found “incredible 
sloppiness” and a “complete inattention to the corporate 
forms and formalities.”  (App. at 342.)  And it saw “a credible 
basis here for inferring possible mismanagement and 
wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Elkin.”  (App. at 341.)  The 
Court expressed doubt that “serious damage” had been done 
to Norman, but nevertheless concluded that there was a 
sufficient basis to allow Norman access to USM records to 
look for signs of wrongdoing.  (App. at 342.)  Weight must be 
given to that judgment when considering the propriety of 
tolling.  
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the December 2002 Letter he received from USM.  We will 
therefore remand to allow the District Court to determine, 
consistent with our reasoning above, whether the statute of 
limitations was tolled from the initiation of Norman’s § 220 
action in November 2004 until the successful completion of it 
in October 2005.  Cf. Technicorp, 2000 WL 713750, at *9 
(indicating that it is the institution of the § 220 action (or 
other litigation) “to ascertain the facts involved in the later 
suit” that tolls the limitations period). 
 
Because the District Court rejected the argument for 
§ 220-based tolling, it has never conclusively resolved 
whether Norman’s claims would be timely if tolling were to 
apply.  It is possible that the District Court may still conclude 
that several of the claims were already barred when Norman 
filed his § 220 action in November 2004.  With regard to the 
conversion claim, the Court strongly suggested, but did not 
definitively determine, that public records would have put 
Norman on notice of the transfer of licenses to TEG in 1998.  
Norman II, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 473.20  With regard to the 
breach of contract theories, the District Court indicated that 
an unspecified combination of the 2000 and 2001 K-1 forms, 
the summer 2002 phone call, the December 2002 Letter, and 
the October 2003 Letter had put Norman on inquiry notice.  
                                              
20 The District Court noted “that [Norman] was not 
incapable of learning the facts giving rise to his conversion 
and usurpation claims” in 1998.  Norman II, 726 F. Supp. 2d 
at 473.  However, it did not definitively determine that 
Norman’s notice of the sale was sufficient because it 
concluded that the events of 2002, such as the December 
2002 letter, were clearly adequate.  Id. 
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Norman IV, 2015 WL 4886049, at *3. 21  And with regard to 
the breach of fiduciary duty claims, the Court decided that 
                                              
21 Norman argues that the District Court should have 
been bound by its earlier decision in Norman II that the 
breach of contract claim based on Elkin’s failure to make a 
pro rata distribution was timely.  But “we have consistently 
held” that reconsideration is appropriate when “new evidence 
is available … or … the earlier decision was clearly 
erroneous and would create manifest injustice[.]”  Roberts v. 
Ferman, 826 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Pub. 
Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, 
Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 1997)).  In such 
circumstances, a District Court is entitled to reconsider its 
decision if it “explain[s] on the record the reasoning behind 
its decision to reconsider the prior ruling … [and] take[s] 
appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by 
reliance on the prior ruling.”  Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 
568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997). 
The District Court explained that it was re-evaluating 
Norman II because the earlier decisions were based “on a 
more limited evidentiary record” and there was an 
“evidentiary hole in the first trial” that was filled by evidence 
provided in the second trial.  Norman v. Elkin (“Norman IV”), 
CIV. A. No. 06-005-LPS, 2015 WL 4886049, at *3 n.5 (D. 
Del. Aug. 14, 2015) (citation omitted from second quotation).  
In particular, the October 2002 Letter was part of the record 
in the first trial, but the Court in Norman II erroneously 
concluded that “[t]he letter sent from [Norman’s] counsel to 
Defendant Elkin is not in evidence, and therefore, the Court 
cannot consider it.”  726 F. Supp. 2d at 471.  The District 
Court was therefore entitled to reconsider its decision in light 
of the new evidence of the content of the letter and in order to 
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Norman had inquiry notice “by December 2002” but did not 
decide whether Norman had notice at an earlier point.  
Norman II, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 474-75.  The Court also 
dismissed, without additional clarification, the declaratory 
judgment and unjust enrichment claims, because they were 
“based on the same facts as previously addressed in 
[Norman’s] other claims[.]”  Id. at 476.  Since determining 
precisely when Norman had inquiry notice is a highly fact-
intensive question, see Cantor, 414 F.3d at 441 (explaining 
that determining “when a reasonable person in plaintiffs’ 
position knew or should have known of the claim” is “a fact 
intensive inquiry”), the District Court should address it in the 
first instance, with the purpose of determining whether 
Norman should benefit from tolling as a result of the filing of 
the § 220 action and, if so, whether his claims are timely even 
if tolling based on the § 220 action is appropriate.22  
                                                                                                     
correct an erroneous ruling.  The Court explained its 
reasoning at length on the record and also made efforts to 
minimize undue prejudice by allowing both parties to 
extensively brief and argue the statute of limitations issue. 
Norman IV, 2015 WL 4886049, at *2-3.  Accordingly, there 
was no error in that regard. 
 
22 As is discussed herein, we conclude that Norman’s 
fraud claim can be rejected on alternative grounds.  
Therefore, we do not opine on the timeliness of that claim.  
Norman’s appellate briefs only lightly touch upon his claims 
other than breach of contract, conversion, and fraud.  Our 
basis for vacatur (the failure to apply the correct test for 
tolling in light of § 220) applies fully to Norman’s other 
claims, and Norman argued that “the [D]istrict [C]ourt erred 
when it held that Norman’s pursuit of his statutory books and 
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B. Breach of Contract via the Shareholder Loan  
  Agreement 
 
The District Court overturned the jury’s verdict that 
Elkin had committed a breach of contract when he caused 
USM to enter into the Shareholder Loan Agreement with him.  
As the Court saw it, the claim failed because Norman could 
not point to any independent damages flowing from the 
signing of the Shareholder Loan Agreement.23   Norman, of 
course, argues that the Court’s analysis and conclusion are 
wrong.  In response, Elkin says that Norman waived any such 
argument when he conceded before the District Court that 
                                                                                                     
records demands and lawsuit under [8 Del. C. § 220] did not 
toll his statute of limitations for all claims[.]”  (Opening Br. at 
2 (emphasis added).) Therefore, we also vacate the judgment 
against Norman’s claims for usurpation of corporate 
opportunity, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, and 
unjust enrichment.  The District Court should consider 
whether the other claims were in fact timely and should be 
put before a jury. 
 
23 See Norman IV, 2015 WL 4886049, at *2 (“At trial, 
Norman failed to present evidence from which a reasonable 
factfinder, even drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of 
Norman, could have found that Norman proved he was 
damaged as a result of Elkin’s signing the [Shareholder Loan 
Agreement].  At the hearing, Norman’s counsel conceded that 
he did not present evidence that Norman was damaged by the 
execution of the [Shareholder Loan Agreement], independent 
of the alleged derivative damages resulting from execution of 
the Agreement.”). 
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there were “no independent damages” flowing from the 
signing of the Shareholder Loan Agreement. (App. at 951.)   
 
The two breach of contract claims Norman continues 
to press are before us in a peculiar posture.  Both stem from 
the same oral agreement, and both allegedly led to the same 
injury, namely the failure to receive distributions according to 
the equity structure of USM.  In this case in which the parties 
agree on practically nothing, everyone agrees that Norman 
sought the same set of damages through the claim of breach 
by failure to make pro rata distributions and the claim of 
breach by entering the Shareholder Loan Agreement.  
 
The confounding factor is that, procedurally, the pro 
rata distribution breach is arguably untimely and has been 
objected to, while the Shareholder Loan Agreement breach 
might also be untimely but was not objected to as such.  
Therefore, the statute of limitations might stand as a bar to the 
former claim but not the latter.  Norman has endeavored to 
use his Shareholder Loan Agreement claim as a way to reach 
the pool of damages that existed only derivatively from the 
failure to make pro rata distributions, while he sidesteps the 
issue of timeliness.  This may be what led the District Court 
to conclude that Norman was required to prove damages other 
than those barred by the statute of limitations in order to 
prevail on his breach of contract claim concerning the 
Shareholder Loan Agreement.   
 
Assuming it turns out to be the case that the pro rata 
distribution claim is time-barred, we agree with the District 
Court that Norman should not be able to rely on an earlier 
breach of the oral agreement in order to bypass the statute of 
limitations and reach the same set of damages that would 
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otherwise be off limits.  If Norman knew about the improper 
distributions and failed to bring a timely suit, he cannot revive 
his claim by asserting that the Shareholder Loan Agreement 
ultimately resulted in the same damages, even if Elkin did not 
raise a statute of limitations defense with respect to that 
earlier breach.  Cf. Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 
190 (1997) (concluding in the antitrust and RICO contexts 
that a “plaintiff cannot use an independent, new predicate act 
as a bootstrap to recover for injuries caused by other earlier 
predicate acts that took place outside the limitations period”); 
Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 1999), 
(applying Klehr and concluding that plaintiffs “cannot rely on 
new injuries arising out of predicate acts of racketeering … to 
recover for any injuries caused by these ‘earlier predicate acts 
that took place outside the limitations period’” (quoting 
Klehr, 521 U.S. at 190)), overruled on other grounds by 
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000). 
 
That does not mean, however, that Elkin’s breach via 
the Shareholder Loan Agreement was not a breach.  It was, 
and the District Court erred in rejecting the breach of contract 
claim regarding the Shareholder Loan Agreement on the 
grounds that Norman could not prove anything but nominal 
damages.  Delaware courts have followed the approach of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 346, which states that 
“[t]here are … instances in which loss is caused but recovery 
for that loss is precluded because it cannot be proved with 
reasonable certainty … . In all these instances the injured 
party will nevertheless get judgment for nominal damages[.]”  
See Ivize of Milwaukee, LLC v. Compex Litig. Support, LLC, 
CIV. A. Nos. 3158, 3406, 2009 WL 1111179, at *12 n.48 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2009) (quoting the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 346); Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts 
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§ 64:6 (4th ed. 2017) (“An unexcused failure to perform a 
contract is a legal wrong.  An action will therefore lie for the 
breach although it causes no injury”).  Even if the damage 
from Elkin’s execution of the Shareholder Loan Agreement 
was limited to the disavowal of his obligation to contribute 
$750,000 in capital and the wrongful recharacterization of 
some of his contributions as “loans,” Norman would still at 
least be entitled to nominal damages.  We therefore conclude 
that the District Court erred in vacating the jury’s verdict with 
regard to the Shareholder Loan Agreement.  At a minimum, 
on remand, Norman is entitled to reinstatement of the jury’s 
verdict with respect to that breach of contract and to nominal 
damages.24 
 
                                              
24 Since the District Court concluded that there were 
no damages, it did not consider Elkin’s alternative argument 
that there was insufficient evidence of an agreement 
preventing him from causing the company to execute the 
Shareholder Loan Agreement.  But in Norman II, the District 
Court had already decided that “sufficient evidence was 
presented on which the jury could have concluded that an 
agreement between [Norman] and Defendant Elkin existed 
for Defendant Elkin to contribute $750,000 in capital, and 
that Defendant Elkin breached that agreement when he 
executed the Shareholder Loan Agreement to convert any 
funds in excess of $420,000 from capital to loans.”  726 F. 
Supp. 2d at 477.  We see no reason to overturn that well-
reasoned ruling.  
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IV. CROSS APPEAL 
 
 Elkin filed a cross-appeal and argues that, even if 
Norman’s fraud and conversion claims were timely, we can 
affirm the District Court’s entry of judgment on those claims 
because Norman did not support them with sufficient 
evidence.  Affirmance on that basis is appropriate “only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [Norman] 
and giving [him] the advantage of every fair and reasonable 
inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury 
reasonably could find liability [against Elkin].”  Lightning 
Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Such a “judgment as a matter of law should be granted 
sparingly, [but] a scintilla of evidence is not enough to sustain 
a verdict of liability.”  Id.  We conclude that Elkin’s argument 
about conversion was inadequately briefed and, accordingly, 
has been effectively waived.  Elkin’s fraud argument, 
however, was fully developed and we agree that under 
Delaware law, Norman failed to prove that Elkin’s fraudulent 
conduct damaged him.   
 
A. Conversion  
 
For an argument to be preserved on appeal it must be 
presented “together with supporting arguments and citations.”  
Simmons v. City of Phila., 947 F.2d 1042, 1065 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(citation omitted).  “It is well settled that if an appellant fails 
to comply with these requirements on a particular issue, the 
appellant normally has abandoned and waived that issue on 
appeal and it need not be addressed by the court of appeals.”  
Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).   
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Elkin’s argument with regard to conversion is cursory 
at best.  After stating the legal tests for conversion and 
misappropriation, Elkin asserts that “Norman offered no 
evidence of any property interest that was convertible” and no 
evidence “of any appropriate measure of damages that the 
jury could employ to develop a reasonable award[.]”  (Ans. 
Br. at 77 (internal quotation marks omitted).)  The support 
offered for that assertion is a reference to a memorandum 
filed in the District Court in connection with Elkin’s motion 
for judgment as a matter of law.  But an attempt to 
incorporate by reference arguments made in the District Court 
does not satisfy the rules of appellate procedure.  See Fed. R. 
App. P. 28(a)(8) and (b) (stating that a party’s brief must 
contain “the argument” including “contentions and the 
reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of 
the record on which the [party] relies”); cf. Nagle v. Alspach, 
8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993) (“When an issue is either not 
set forth in the statement of issues presented or not pursued in 
the argument section of the brief, the appellant has abandoned 
and waived that issue on appeal.”).  Elkin has thus waived his 
argument with respect to the conversion claim.  
 
B. Fraud 
 
Elkin also argues that there was insufficient evidence 
to justify the jury’s verdict on the fraud claim.  Under 
Delaware law, the elements of fraud are:  
 
(1) a false representation of (or concealment of) 
a fact; (2) defendant’s knowledge or belief that 
the representation was false, or was made with 
reckless indifference to the truth; (3) an intent to 
induce the plaintiff or to cause plaintiff to 
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refrain from acting; (4) [plaintiff’s] action or 
inaction taken in justifiable reliance upon the 
representation; and (5) damage to plaintiff as a 
result of such reliance.   
 
Yarger v. ING Bank, fsb, 285 F.R.D. 308, 327 (D. Del. 2012).  
Importantly, in cases involving both a breach of contract and 
an allegation of fraud, damages from the fraud must be pled 
“separate and apart from … breach damages.”  Cornell 
Glasgow, LLC v. La Grange Properties, LLC, CIV. A. No. 
N11C-05-016, 2012 WL 2106945, at *9 (Del. Super. Ct. 
June 6, 2012); see also Lazard Debt Recovery GP, LLC v. 
Weinstock, 864 A.2d 955, 972 (Del. Ch. 2004) (dismissing a 
fraud claim for failure “to plead loss causation sufficiently”).  
While there may have been sufficient evidence to support all 
of the other elements of fraud, there is no evidence in the 
record that Norman suffered damages as a result of the fraud 
that are separate and apart from the damages alleged for 
breaches of contract.  
 
The basis for Norman’s fraud claim was the December 
2002 Letter that understated the amount that Elkin paid 
himself from USM’s coffers.  However, the improper 
distributions had already occurred by the time the December 
2002 Letter was sent.25  Norman has not presented any 
evidence to the contrary.26  Nor has he pointed to any other 
                                              
25 The only transaction listed on the Shareholder Loan 
Schedule after the December 2002 Letter is a loan of $12,000 
from Elkin on December 21, 2002.     
 
26 Norman attempts to incorporate by reference his 
post-trial briefing in the District Court.  Again, that is 
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way that the damages he suffered would have been lessened 
had he found out about the full extent of the payments made 
to Elkin at the time of the December 2002 Letter rather than 
as a result of the October 2003 Letter.  
 
In other words, the damages that Norman suffered 
from Elkin’s failure to make pro rata distributions were not 
caused by the allegedly fraudulent December 2002 Letter.  
Instead, the damages Norman claims he suffered as a result of 
the fraud are merely a “rehash” of damages claimed for the 
alleged breaches of the oral contract.  See Cornell Glasgow, 
2012 WL 2106945, at *9 (“Delaware courts have consistently 
held that to successfully plead a fraud claim, the allegedly 
defrauded plaintiff must have sustained damages as a result of 
a defendant’s actions.  And the damages allegations may not 
simply ‘rehash’ the damages allegedly caused by the breach 
of contract.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Because 
Norman did not show “with particularity what [Elkin] 
obtained through [his] alleged fraud,” Albert v. Alex. Brown 
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., CIV. A. Nos. 762-N, 763-N, 2005 WL 
2130607, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2005), there was no basis 
for the jury to find that Elkin’s fraud had damaged Norman.  
See ITW Glob. Invs. Inc. v. Am. Indus. Partners Capital Fund 
IV, L.P., CIV. A. No. N14C-10-236, 2015 WL 3970908, at *5 
(Del. Super. Ct. June 24, 2015) (“Because [the plaintiff] has 
pleaded materially identical damages … they fail to separate 
the damages incurred by any alleged fraudulent 
misrepresentation and any alleged breach of contract … .  
Accordingly, [the] Count … for fraud must be dismissed 
                                                                                                     
impermissible.  Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 
1993).  And in any event, the brief that he cites does not point 
to any specific evidence in the record. 
Case: 16-1924     Document: 003112649216     Page: 39      Date Filed: 06/13/2017
40 
 
because it pleads damages that are simply a ‘rehash’ of the 
breach of contract damages.”).  We will therefore affirm the 
District Court’s decision to vacate the fraud judgment and to 
grant judgment as a matter of law in Elkin’s favor on that 
claim.   
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm on 
alternative grounds the decision to enter judgment in Elkin’s 
favor on the claim of fraud.  We will vacate the entry of 
judgment in Elkin’s favor on Norman’s other claims and will 
remand to the District Court to reinstate the award of nominal 
damages for the breach of contract claim concerning the 
Shareholder Loan Agreement and to determine whether § 220 
tolling should apply, and, if so, whether any of the remaining 
claims are timely.  
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